Traditionally, grammaticalisation has been described as being based on language-specific phenomena such as metaphorical extension or reanalysis. This characterisation is somewhat in contrast to claims that grammaticalisation is involved in the much more general process of the initial emergence of language. In this article, we provide a unified analysis of both the metaphor-based and the reanalysis-based account of grammaticalisation which is grounded in the cognitive mechanisms underlying ostensive-inferential communication. We are thus able to show that the process of grammaticalisation is an instantiation of a domain-general pre-linguistic phenomenon.
Introduction
The way grammaticalisation has been dealt with in historical linguistics and in evolutionary linguistics is somewhat paradoxical. In historical linguistics, it is usually described as a highly specific linguistic process (Givón 1979; Bybee et al. 1994; Haspelmath 1998; Hopper & Traugott 2003) , whereas in evolutionary linguistics, it is frequently invoked as an explanation for the emergence of language in general (Heine & Kuteva 2002a; Hurford 2003; Tallerman 2007) . Grammaticalisation denotes the (unidirectional) process by which a discourse strategy, syntactic construction, word or morpheme loses some of its independence of use and becomes more functional in its meaning. It can be characterised as a process of semantic bleaching and generalisation accompanied by phonological reduction. Two major types of explanations have been suggested for this process in the literature: one identifies metaphorical extension as the origin of grammaticalisation (Heine et al. 1991) , the other one the phenomenon of reanalysis (Hopper & Traugott 2003) . Common to both approaches, however, is that they describe grammaticalisation as a relatively high-level, languagespecific process. The claim that grammaticalisation constitutes one of the sources of the emergence of language in the first place (Heine & Kuteva 2002a; Hurford 2003 ) presents somewhat of a contrast to the way it has been described in historical linguistics. An account of the origins of language must necessarily transcend its explanandum and provide explanations that are based on mechanisms more basic than language. Recently, however, it has been questioned whether the process of grammaticalisation can really live up to this requirement (Newmeyer 2006) .
In this article, we provide a unified analysis of both the metaphorbased and the reanalysis-based accounts of grammaticalisation; this unified analysis is grounded in the general cognitive mechanisms involved in ostensive-inferential communication. We are thus able to show that the process of grammaticalisation constitutes-contrary to how it has traditionally been characterised in historical linguistics-a domain-general pre-linguistic phenomenon. Our account is thereby in line with calls for a more cognition-oriented study of grammaticalisation (Heine 1997; Kuteva 2001; Tomasello 2003) :
"Exactly how grammaticalization and syntacticization happen in the concrete interactions of individual human beings and groups of human beings, and how these processes might relate to the other processes of sociogenesis by means of which human social interaction ratchets up the complexity of cultural artefacts, requires more psychologically based linguistic research into processes of linguistic communication and language change." (Tomasello 2003: 103) The remainder of this paper falls into two main parts. We first identify the cognitive underpinnings of both the metaphor-based and the renalysis-based approaches to grammaticalisation. In the second part of the article, we then project these cognitive mechanisms to instances of pre-linguistic ostensive-inferential communication. We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our approach to both the study of grammaticalisation and language evolution research.
A unified approach
In the following discussion of the cognitive foundations of the metaphorbased and the reanalysis-based account of grammaticalisation, we use the example of the English construction be going to to illustrate our analysis. The grammaticalisation of be going to is one of the most cited examples in the grammaticalisation literature (Heine et al. 1991; Kuteva 2001; Hopper & Traugott 2003; Evans & Green 2006) , and is also a particular instance of grammaticalisation which is very common, both historically and cross-linguistically (Heine & Kuteva 2002b ). Originally, be going to stood for spatial motion but later it came to express intention and futurity, as shown in example (1).
(1) a. We are going to Windsor to see the King.
b. We are going to get married in June.
(intention/futurity, not motion) (examples from Bybee 2003: 147).
However, before we can move on to discuss the accounts of the grammaticalisation of be going to proposed by the metaphor-based and the reanalysis-based approach respectively, it is necessary that we provide a brief introduction of the notion of ostensive-inferential communication and its cognitive underpinnings, on which our analysis will be based.
Ostensive-inferential communication
Ostensive-inferential communication builds on the awareness of common ground. Common ground is knowledge which two interlocutors recognise as being shared in a given situation. It implies (i) that the interlocutors recognise the said knowledge as shared, (ii) that they are aware that the other interlocutor recognises it as shared too, and (iii) that they realise that the other interlocutor also knows that they are aware of this (Lewis 1969; Clark 1996; Sperber & Wilson 1995) .
On the basis of common ground, communication can be established through an ostensive act performed by the communicator (a modification of the physical environment which constitutes an enhancement of the interlocutors' common ground) and an inferential act performed by the addressee but predicted and invited by the communicator (the inference of some new information on the basis of the now altered context).
Two special types of common ground deserve to be mentioned explicitly here. First, it is essential, for ostensive-inferential communication to be possible, that the interlocutors have a shared understanding of the assumed goal of a given interaction-which in turn builds on some understanding of each other's intentions (Tomasello et al. 2005) . 
The metaphor-based scenario
Before we sketch the metaphor-based scenario of grammaticalisation, it seems appropriate to specify how we conceive the notion of 'metaphor'.
What most definitions developed by metaphor theorists have in common is the core idea that metaphorical language use denotes situations where an extant linguistic form is used ("transferred" in the sense of the original Greek metaphérein) to express a meaning (its "metaphorical meaning") which is similar, but not identical, to the one that form is conventionally associated with (its "literal meaning") (Kövecses 2002) . Lakoff & Johnson (1980) Langacker (1987: 69f.) , Sperber & Wilson (1995: 231-37) , Carston (1997) , Croft (2000: 99-114 ) and Wilson & Carston (2007) . Metaphorical use is thus not only
the basis of what we perceive as poetic language but also occurs in the small-scale deviances from convention that are ubiquitous in ordinary every-day talk (Deutscher 2005: 117ff.) . It denotes any case of language use where parts of the conventional meaning of the expressed linguistic form are ignored by the interlocutors because they are not relevant in the given context. The more obviously these dismissed parts of the conventional meaning would conflict with the actually communicated meaning, the more figurative appears the respective instance of language use to be. Therefore, when we talk about metaphorical use, we refer not to any arbitrary degree of deviance from convention but to the underlying cognitive mechanism defining continuum of "loose talk" (Sperber & Wilson 1995) or "partial sanction" (Langacker 1987 ) that extends between literalness and poetic metaphor.
Likewise, we speak of individual instances of metaphorical extension and not of the metaphor-complexes (also called "conceptual metaphors") that e.g. Lakoff & Johnson (1980) The reasons why speakers use extant conventions metaphorically are manifold. They may want to attract attention, establish prestige, avoid committing themselves the way they would if they used a literal expression (Pinker et al. 2008) , or a metaphor may simply be shorter than a cumbersome literal circumlocution. A crucial aspect of metaphorical language use, however, is its creative potential:
a metaphor may allow a speaker to express a meaning for which no extant convention exists yet. This was obviously not the case for be going to-English contained ways of expressing intention already before the grammaticalisation of be going to. But this aspect of metaphorical use will play a vital role in the examples discussed later in this article.
Along these lines, example (3) illustrates what we will call the metaphor-based scenario of grammaticalisation. A speaker intends to express intention (3a). She uses the form for spatial motion metaphorically, assuming that the hearer will realise that (i) spatial motion is irrelevant in the current context, and (ii) spatial motion often implies intention, which in turn is relevant (3b-f). The hearer realises that the literal meaning of the signal is irrelevant in the current context, and falls back on intention, which he associates-and knows the speaker associates-with spatial motion (3g-m).
(3) Detail of the metaphor-based scenario.
Speaker:
(a) I want to express intention.
(b) I have a construction which expresses spatial motion, and the hearer shares this convention.
(c) spatial motion is associated with intention.
(d) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, the hearer will be aware of (b)-(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use the construction for spatial motion metaphorically to convey intention.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
Hearer:
(g) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(h) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(i) spatial motion often implies intention.
(j) intention would be relevant in the given context.
(k) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (f)-(j), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (f)-(k), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey intention.
Conventionalisation
The scenario described above illustrates how the original linguistic convention associated with be going to could have been used in a specific situation to communicate the meaning which be going to would later become to stand for. However, such an instance of ostensiveinferential communication is only the first step on the way to grammaticalisation. A second step needs to follow it for the process of grammaticalisation to be complete: the conveyed utterance meaning 13 needs to become a new linguistic convention itself. This additional cognitive process of conventionalisation is initiated when the speaker and the hearer memorise the particular usage of an expression which they have just experienced. In the case described in (3), they may remember that be going to was used to convey intention, while at the same time maintaining their knowledge that it conventionally expresses spatial motion. The memorisation of the usage of an expression therefore has two effects: the entrenchment of a new form-meaning association, and the establishment of new common ground between the involved individuals.
The more frequently a particular expression like be going to is used to convey the same meaning, the more deeply the association between that form and the meaning will become entrenched in the knowledge of the user. Such entrenchment is a form of automatisation where an experienced association between a form and a meaning turns into a psychological unit and that unit becomes enforced (Langacker 1987) in the user's encyclopedic knowledge. The more deeply a form-meaning association is entrenched, the more readily it is accessible: if, for instance, the association between be going to and intention is sufficiently entrenched, it may be activated without the complex reasoning that was necessary to invoke it when that entrenchement had not yet happened. Through entrenchment, a form-meaning association can thus gain a certain degree of independence from its context of use. The depth of entrenchment is related to frequency of usage, because with each usage event, the association between the used linguistic form and the communicated meaning is further entrenched in both the speaker and the hearer, that is, in all individuals involved in the communicative episode (Croft 2000) .
While entrenchment affects each user individually, the memorisation of usages also has a more social component: it adds to the common ground that two individuals share. The awareness that be going to has in previous contexts been used successfully to convey intention, and that the hearer shares this knowledge, will allow the speaker to re-use be going to in the same sense in later communicative situations with the same hearer even when the context would not allow for the reasoning detailed in (3). Like entrenchment, the establishment of new common ground thus lets an association between a linguistic form and the meaning that form has been used to communicate become more context-independent. Once it has become common ground, an association between a form and a meaning can itself serve as background knowledge on the basis of which novel utterance meanings can be conveyed in future acts of ostensive-inferential communication.
The Note that usage memorisation can bring about a situation of layering in an individual's linguistic knowledge, if the employed linguistic form is newly associated with a meaning that is different from its conventional meaning. The memorisation of the usage event described in (3) above, for instance, will lead to the speaker and the hearer entertaining two linguistic conventions involving be going to: one that associates it with spatial motion and another one that associates it with intention. However, the old and the new convention might exhibit different degrees of entrenchment. If they are both sufficiently entrenched, the impression of polysemy arises, and the expression is conceived as having multiple meanings.
The reanalysis-based scenario
As above, before we present the reanalysis-based scenario of grammaticalisation, we first explain our conception of reanalysis. Whenever a hearer interprets an utterance, he creates a set of mappings between the form and the meaning which he assumes the speaker intends to convey with her utterance. Such mappings can be of arbitrary complexity, including not only a mapping between the whole form and the whole meaning, but also mappings between individual components of the form and their semantic counterparts, as interpreted in the context of use. Every set of form-meaning mappings is thus an analysis of the way in which the form represents the meaning associated with it. If multiple analyses of the same form differ in any way, then we can say that a re-analysis of the relationship between form and meaning has taken place.
Our notion of reanalysis is similar to, but broader than, that pro-posed by Hopper & Traugott (2003) , who suggest that reanalysis occurs whenever "the hearer understands a form to have a structure and a meaning that are different from those of the speaker" (Hopper & Traugott 2003: 50) . We concur with this, but note that reanaly- It is important to note that because the mappings between form and meaning are internal to every linguistic individual, both they, and therefore also reanalysis itself, can never be directly observed.
Differences between two sets of mappings can therefore only be uncovered through actualisation (Trask 2000) , when utterances are produced which are consistent with only one of the analyses. An actualisation of the analysis of be going to as a marker of intention or futurity but not motion is shown in example (4): the utterance in 4(a)
can be happily interpreted as either intention or motion, with no change in the communicative effect, while the utterance in 4(b) cannot be intrepreted as motion, because this clashes with the meaning of stay. This clash forces the intention interpretation as the only one which is communicatively plausible, and this thereby makes clear, or actualises, the analysis which maps be going to to intention.
(4) a. I am going to play football this evening.
b. I am going to stay here this evening.
Given this notion of reanalysis, therefore, we now set out the details of our reanalysis-based scenario in example (5), in which the speaker uses be going to in its conventional sense to express spatial motion-the expression of which she deems relevant in the given context (3a-e)
The hearer, however, perceives things differently; he does not think that spatial motion is relevant in the present situation but does believe that information about intention would be (3f-l). From the hearer's perspective, this appears to be exactly the same scenario as the metaphor-based scenario in example (3). This time, the interlocutors make different adjustments to their codes: the speaker will further entrench the convention that maps be going to onto spatial motion, whereas the hearer establishes a new, additional association between be going to and intention.
(5) Detail of the renalysis-based scenario.
(a) I want to express spatial motion. (e) Because of (d), I can use the construction to communicate spatial motion.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
(f) The speaker has expressed spatial motion.
(g) spatial motion is not relevant in the given context.
(h) spatial motion often implies intention.
(i) intention would be relevant in the given context.
(j) I must assume that the speaker is co-operative.
(k) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (f)-(j), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(l) From (f)-(k), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey intention.
A special case of the reanalysis-based scenario is one where the hearer, in the role of a language learner, has no existing mapping for be going to in his lexicon. However, because he can work out from the context that the speaker intends to express intention, he will create an association between that meaning and be going to. In contrast to the previous two scenarios, layering does not arise in the hearer's linguistic knowledge in this case.
Comparing the two scenarios
We conclude from the analyses presented above that the two scenarios of grammaticalisation, which we have called metaphor-and reanalysis- Probably the most striking observation that arises from the comparison of the two scenarios as we have analysed them is that the hearer's part is exactly the same in the metaphor-based and in the reanalysis-based account. In both cases, the hearer assumes that the speaker has used be going to in a metaphorical sense. What distinguishes the two scenarios in our example is the speaker's reasoning. In the metaphor-based scenario, the speaker intends to express intention and considers it to be common ground that information about spatial motion is irrelevant in the current situation. In the reanalysis-based scenario, the speaker intends to express spatial motion-which she deems relevant in the given context. However, while in the metaphor- can occur in the speaker, or in the hearer, or in both interlocutors, or in neither. This finding is summarised in Table 1 . In order to complete the picture, we have also included in the table the two conditions which do not contribute to grammaticalisation: when a speaker uses language in its conventional sense and the hearer interprets it likewise (shown in the first row of the table), and when a speaker uses language innovatively but the hearer interprets it as an instance of conventional use (shown in the last row of the table). The latter could, of course, initiate grammaticalisation in the speaker's grammar, but for this innovation to spread, it would later have to occur under one of the other three sets of conditions.
[Insert Table 1 here.]
Finally, we consider a condition which combines aspects of both the metaphor-based and the reanalysis-based scenarios: the speaker and hearer are both innovative in their usage, yet there is also a contextual mismatch, because they make different innovations, and thus different adjustments to their internal linguistic representations. In (6), the speaker intends to express intention, and so uses the form for spatial motion metaphorically, assuming that the hearer will realise that spatial motion is irrelevant, but that it often implies intention, which is relevant (6a-f). The hearer recognises that spatial motion is irrelevant, but assumes that the form is being used metaphorically to express futurity, not intention. This scenario clearly illustrates the fundamentally approximate and uncertain nature of ostensive-inferential communication (Hurford 2007) ; neither interlocutor ever knows the exact details of the other's knowledge, but must form, and act upon, assumptions made on the basis of their shared experiences.
(6) Detail of a scenario combining both metaphor-based and reanalysis-based aspects.
[Speaker expresses spatial motion]
(i) spatial motion often implies futurity.
(j) futurity would be relevant in the given context.
(l) I must also assume that the speaker is aware that I know (g)-(k), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)-(l), I conclude that the speaker intends to convey futurity.
The pre-linguistic basis
We now turn to the question of how our unified analysis of the process of grammaticalisation relates to the origin of language. We claim that early human pre-linguistic communication must have exhibited the same structure as the linguistic scenarios we have described. In the following paragraphs, we discuss a typical approach to language evolution in light of the above analysis of the mechanisms involved in ostensive-inferential communication. [Individual A expresses growling.]
Individual B:
(a) Individual A has expressed growling.
(b) growling itself is not relevant in the given context.
(c) growling often implies lion.
(d) lion would be relevant in the given context.
(e) I must assume that individual A is co-operative.
(f) I must also assume that individual A is aware that I know (a)-(e), and that I know of his being aware of it. In contrast to Burling's assumptions, our analysis suggests that the capacities to produce and comprehend ostensive cues do not emerge at different moments in human evolution. They are rather both based on the same set of more basic cognitive abilities, and once these are in place, both production and comprehension are available to an indi-vidual.
(8) Detail of a metaphor-like scenario for the origin of a pre-linguistic communicative convention.
Individual A:
(a) I want to express lion.
(b) I can express growling.
(c) growling is associated with lion.
(d) growling is not relevant in the given context.
(e) Because we share common ground, individual B will be aware of (b)-(d), and realise that I am aware of it too.
(f) Because of (e), I can use growling (quasi "metaphorically") to convey lion.
[Individual A expresses growling.]
(g) Individual A has expressed growling.
(h) growling is not relevant in the given context.
(i) growling often implies lion.
(j) lion would be relevant in the given context.
(l) I must also assume that individual A is aware that I know (g)-(k), and that I know of his being aware of it.
(m) From (g)-(l), I conclude that individual A intends to convey lion.
Semantic Reconstruction
To complete the parallel with the linguistic analysis above, we present a scenario containing aspects of both metaphor-like and renalysis-like scenarios, in which both interlocutors are innovative, but they make different innovations. In example (9), one individual growls in order to warn another of the presence of a lion (9a-f), but the latter erroneously interprets it as a warning about a jackal (9g-m). Both interpretations may have the same perlocutionary effect (for instance, that both individuals climb into the trees to escape), and so the mismatch in understanding remains unnoticed.
(9) Detail of a pre-linguistic scenario that combines metaphor-like and reanalysis-like aspects.
(b) I can express growling. (f) Because of (e), I can use growling (quasi "metaphorically") to convey lion.
(i) growling often implies lion or jackal.
(j) jackal would be relevant in the given context, lion not.
(k) I must assume that individual A is co-operative.
(m) From (g)-(l), I conclude that individual A intends to convey jackal.
In all versions of Burling's scenario, the observed form and the inferred meaning are associated, memorised and subsequently conventionalised in the individuals' encyclopaedic knowledge bases. In the scenarios characterised by mismatches in the individuals' assumptions, however, these developing conventions also differ: in (7) only the "hearer" in fact memorises the usage and assumes that it is common ground, while in (9) both individuals memorise different usages.
Because these new associations have been made by no-one else, an individual can only re-use them successfully in future situations if the context provides enough clues for the meaning to be reconstructed.
The inferential reconstruction of meaning is the mechanism through which form-meaning mappings persist and survive over time; those mappings whose meanings can be easily and repeatedly reconstructed will be preferentially replicated, while those which are difficult to reconstruct will quickly perish (Smith 2008) .
From the analyses presented in this section, we can see that the same general cognitive reasoning processes underpin all ostensiveinferential communication, both linguistic and pre-linguistic. These same mechanisms, which we have shown to be fundamental to the process of grammaticalisation in modern languages, could therefore also have been behind the emergence of communicative conventions, both linguistic and pre-linguistic.
Conclusion
In this paper we have examined the metaphor-based and reanalysisbased approaches to grammaticalisation in detail, and have provided a unified account based not on their linguistic properties, but on the cognitive mechanisms underlying ostensive-inferential communication,
such as the assumption of common ground between interlocutors, and the memorisation of communicative experiences. Moreover, we have shown that these mechanisms are not specific to language, but are instead instances of much more fundamental, domain-general cognitive properties. Having characterised grammaticalisation in terms of domain-general mechanisms which are more basic and ancient than language, we then explored the emergence of pre-linguistic conventions using the same framework, and concluded that the same cognitive processes were also at work in this case. We therefore claim that acknowledging the cognitive mechanisms underlying ostensiveinferential communication will not only allow us to shed new light on the linguistic study of grammaticalisation, but will also provide the 37 foundation for a unified explanation of historical language change and the origin and evolution of language. 
